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INTRODUCTION 
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Act”), which 
banned the sale of all flavored cigarettes except for menthol.1 On 
July 20, 2010, Indonesia requested the establishment of a Panel of 
the World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”)2 to determine if the ban is “inconsistent with various U.S. 
obligations” as a member of the WTO.3 Indonesia, the largest 
 
 1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 
123 Stat. 1776 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); see Jeff Zeleny, 
Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15 
(describing President Obama’s statements that the new law is an important step in 
youth smoking prevention). 
 2. See Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS406: United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 
21, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/Tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds406_e.htm (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Dispute DS406] (explaining that on September 
9, 2010, the parties agreed to the formal composition of the Panel). 
 3. See Request for Consultations by Indonesia, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 5, WT/DS406/1 (Apr. 14, 
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exporter of clove cigarettes to the United States (“U.S.”) before the 
ban,4 argues that the Act discriminates against Indonesian-produced 
clove cigarettes, thereby violating Article III of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). Indonesia further argues 
that GATT Article XX, which enumerates exceptions for trade 
distorting behavior in certain circumstances, does not provide the 
United States with a valid public health justification for the ban.5  
This Note argues that the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes is 
inconsistent with WTO member obligations arising from current 
interpretations of GATT Articles III and XX. Part II provides 
background on the law that mandates the ban, GATT Articles III and 
XX, and the content of the Indonesian complaint. Part III analyzes 
the Indonesian complaint and argues that menthol and clove 
cigarettes are “like products” under GATT Article III:4 and that the 
United States unfairly discriminates against clove cigarettes. Part III 
also contends that GATT Article XX(b) does not provide the United 
States with a reasonable justification for the ban on public health 
grounds. Part IV offers legislative recommendations for Congress to 
modify the Act to bring the United States into conformity with its 
WTO obligations. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND ON AND PROCEDURAL 
HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE 
A. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND ON THE U.S. STATUTORY BAN OF 
FLAVORED CIGARETTES 
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act gives 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) broad new statutory 
authority to regulate tobacco products under the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).6 Specifically, section 101 of the Act 
 
2010) [hereinafter U.S. – Clove Cigarettes] (setting forth Indonesia’s allegations 
that the United States is violating specific WTO agreements, including Articles III 
and XX of GATT). 
 4. See, e.g., Press Release, World Trade Org. [WTO], U.S. Blocks Indonesian 
Request for Panel on Clove Cigarettes (June 22, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. Blocks 
Indonesian Request], available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/ 
dsb_22jun10_e.htm (noting that before the ban Indonesia exported ninety-nine 
percent of clove cigarettes consumed in the United States). 
 5. See id.; U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 3, ¶ 5(b). 
 6. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 101(b); 
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adds chapter IX, section 907(a)(1)(A) to the FDCA, which bans the 
sale of cigarettes that contain an herb or spice that is a 
“characterizing flavor of the tobacco product.”7 Importantly, section 
907(a)(1)(A) exempts menthol cigarettes from the ban.8 Advocates 
for the ban contend that flavored cigarettes appeal primarily to 
children and encourage them to start smoking.9 The Act does not 
exempt menthol cigarettes from any new regulations, but section 
907(e) requires the creation of a Scientific Advisory Committee to 
issue a report on the impact of menthol cigarettes on public health.10  
B. GATT PROVISIONS RELEVANT TO THE DISPUTE: ARTICLE III:4 
AND ARTICLE XX(B) 
The GATT seeks to “[reduce] tariffs and other barriers to trade 
and [eliminate] discriminatory treatment in international 
commerce.”11 GATT Article III prohibits WTO members from 
imposing taxes (Article III:2) or other regulations (Article III:4) that 
treat imports, after passage through customs, “less favorably” than 
domestic like products.12 This Article embodies the important 
 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2006 & Supp. 
2010). In 1996, the FDA claimed the authority to regulate cigarettes, but was 
subsequently restricted from doing so in the 2000 Supreme Court Decision, FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. See 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000) (concluding 
that Congress did not intend to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco products). The 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act gives the FDA this 
regulatory authority under the FDCA. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act, § 101(b)(3). See generally C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K. 
BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40196, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: 
HISTORY OF THE 1996 RULE AND RELATED LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY, 1998-2008 
(2009) (surveying federal regulation of cigarettes from 1996 through 2009). 
 7. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101(b), 
907(a)(1)(A); see also FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: GENERAL 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE BAN OF CIGARETTES THAT CONTAIN CERTAIN 
CHARACTERIZING FLAVORS 1, 4 (2d ed. 2009) (outlining the FDA’s stance on the 
scope of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act). 
 8. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(a)(1)(A). 
 9. E.g., Press Release, FDA, Candy and Fruit Flavored Cigarettes Now Illegal 
in United States; Step is First Under New Tobacco Law (Sept. 22, 2009), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm 
183211.htm. 
 10. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e). 
 11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade pmbl., Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A–
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. 
 12. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 art. III:1, (2), (4), Apr. 
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principle of national treatment, which holds that all goods and 
services, regardless of origin, must be treated equally after they enter 
into a domestic market.13 Article III:4 applies the national treatment 
principle explicitly to a nation’s enforcement of laws, regulations, 
and other requirements.14 
GATT Article XX enumerates certain “general exceptions” that 
allow members to violate GATT rules if necessary to pursue 
legitimate domestic policies.15 These exceptions exist because the 
WTO recognizes that members must pursue important policies other 
than free trade.16 Article XX(b) allows nations to pursue WTO-
 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 190 [hereinafter GATT] (“The contracting parties 
recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the 
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should 
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to 
domestic production.”); see also Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on 
Alcoholic Beverages, 16, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 
1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Alcohol] (noting that the “after customs” language in 
Article III:1 was intended to prevent indirect protectionism); Appellate Body 
Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – 
Asbestos] (noting that like product under Article III:4 is broader than under Article 
III:2). 
 13. See WTO, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 10-11 (2010), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/understanding_e.pdf 
(describing national treatment as a way to prevent discrimination against foreign 
products, services, or nationals). 
 14. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (“The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of 
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal 
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation of 
the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.”); Japan – 
Alcohol, supra note 12, at 14 (calling the prevention of protectionist measures the 
“broad and fundamental purpose” of Article III). 
 15. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX; see also Appellate Body Report, United 
States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 121, 
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp] (stating that the 
enumerated exceptions in GATT Article XX are recognized as embodying 
domestic policies that are ”important and legitimate in character”). 
 16. See BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 339 (2d ed. 
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inconsistent measures if they are “necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant health.”17 Should a member pursue a policy that falls 
under the scope of Article XX, it does not have to preemptively 
defend the policy unless challenged by another member through the 
GATT’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism.18 The burden of proof falls 
on the member invoking the Article XX exception.19 
C. INDONESIA’S WTO COMPLAINT  
Indonesian diplomats argue that banning clove cigarettes, while 
continuing to allow the sale of menthol cigarettes, would 
discriminate against Indonesian products and therefore violate the 
U.S. obligation to avoid nondiscriminatory trading practices as a 
member of the WTO.20 Indonesia believes that the Act discriminates 
against clove cigarettes because clove cigarettes sold in the United 
States before the ban were imported primarily from Indonesia, 
whereas virtually all menthol cigarettes sold in the United States are 
produced domestically.21 On April 7, 2010, the Indonesian delegation 
 
2001) (recognizing that certain non-economic objectives are vital to countries’ 
public policies). 
 17. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b). 
 18. See HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 16, at 339 (explaining that the lack 
of a notification requirement means that the affected party must initiate the dispute 
if it believes the challenged policy does not fall under an Article XX exception). 
 19. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, 20-21, WT/DS2/9 (May 20, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. – 
Gasoline] (placing the burden of proof on the United States to show, as the party 
invoking the exception, that the discrimination against imported gasoline was 
justified under Article XX when challenged under the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism). 
 20. See 155 CONG. REC. E912, E913-14 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. Virginia Foxx) (introducing into the Congressional Record letters from 
Indonesian Ambassador Parnohadiningrat to the Chairman of the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee Henry Waxman on July 25, 2008, and from the 
Indonesian Minister of Trade, Mari Elka Pangestu, to former Ambassador Schwab 
on August 28, 2007, both of which raised concerns about a ban on flavored 
cigarettes). 
 21. See U.S. Blocks Indonesian Request, supra note 4 (referencing data 
provided by Indonesia that it produces ninety-nine percent of clove cigarettes sold 
in the United States); see also US blocks Indonesian request for panel on clove 
cigarettes (June 22, 2010), http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/dsb_22 
jun10_e.htm (reporting that over ninety-nine percent of clove cigarettes sold in the 
U.S. were produced in Indonesia, and that more than six million Indonesian jobs 
have been affected by the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes); Arti Ekawati & Faisal 
Maliki Baskoro, Clove Tobacco Industry Faces Dual Challenges, JAKARTA GLOBE 
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initiated the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Process by circulating a 
Request for Consultations with the United States.22 Indonesia alleges 
that section 907 of the Act violates GATT Article III:4.23 Indonesia 
maintains that because clove and menthol cigarettes are “like 
products,” and because the ban applies to clove cigarettes, but not to 
menthol cigarettes, it violates the nondiscrimination clause of Article 
III:4.24 Furthermore, Indonesia contends that Article XX(b), which 
allows for limited exceptions to discriminatory trade policies if they 
are necessary to protect human health, does not apply because the 
Act “unjustifiably” and “arbitrarily” discriminates against the 
Indonesian product.25 The United States rejects Indonesia’s 
arguments.26 
 
(June 22, 2010), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/ clove-tobacco-
industry-faces-dual-challenges/382003 (adding to the mounting pressure against 
clove cigarettes, the World Health Organization has proposed a ban on all flavored 
cigarettes in its Framework Convention on Tobacco Control). 
 22. U.S. – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 3, ¶¶ 1-2. See generally Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401. The WTO Dispute Resolution Process is administered by the 
Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). Id. Should Consultations between members 
involved in the dispute fail, a Dispute Resolution Panel will be formed and will 
rule on the dispute. Id. art. 4 ¶ 7. Any party to the dispute can appeal the judgment 
of the Panel to the Appellate Body, which may “uphold, modify, or reverse” the 
Panel’s findings. Id. art. 17, ¶¶ 4, 13. After the Appellate Body releases its report, 
the member who is found to have violated its obligations must state its intention to 
bring its trade practices into conformity with its WTO obligations. Id. art. 21, ¶ 3. 
 23. Dispute DS406, supra note 2, ¶ 5(a). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. ¶¶ 2-5 (outlining Indonesia’s allegations that section 907 of the 
FDCA, in addition to violating GATT, also violates other WTO provisions, 
including the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) and the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS”)). 
SPS sets allowable constraints regarding food safety and sets standards for animal 
and plant health. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. TBT insures that technical standards 
do not result in unnecessary barriers to trade. Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 26. See U.S. Blocks Indonesian Request, supra note 4 (stating the U.S. position 
that Indonesia’s WTO complaint is premature, given the ongoing FDA 
investigation of flavored cigarettes). 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE U.S. BAN ON CLOVE CIGARETTES IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
OBLIGATIONS ARISING UNDER GATT ARTICLE III:4 BECAUSE 
CLOVE CIGARETTES AND MENTHOL CIGARETTES ARE “LIKE 
PRODUCTS” AND THE BAN DISCRIMINATES AGAINST CLOVE 
CIGARETTES. 
GATT Article III:4 prohibits WTO members from passing laws, 
regulations, or other requirements that treat an imported product less 
favorably than a “like” domestically-produced product after it passes 
through customs.27 Section 907 of the FDCA violates Article III:4 
because clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are “like products” 
and the Act discriminates against foreign-produced clove cigarettes 
by allowing the sale of menthol cigarettes. This conclusion is based 
on an Appellate Body determination in EC – Asbestos that broadly 
interpreted “like products” to refer to products that are in a 
competitive relationship.28 
After analyzing the competitive relationship between clove and 
menthol cigarettes, the Dispute Resolution Panel should conclude 
that imported clove cigarettes and domestically produced menthol 
cigarettes are “like products” under Article III:4.29 Consequently, the 
Panel should determine that the treatment of these “like products” is 
discriminatory under GATT because the United States provides 
clove cigarettes with drastically unequal competitive opportunities 
compared to the opportunities afforded to menthol cigarettes.30 
 
 27. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4; see also Japan – Alcohol, supra note 12, at 
15-16 (emphasizing that members can still tax or regulate items to further domestic 
agendas as long as such taxation or regulation does not violate Article III or any 
other WTO agreement and that the “after customs” interpretation is aimed at 
preventing indirect protectionism). 
 28. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 99-100 (acknowledging that the 
Appellate Body’s interpretation of “like products” gives the “provision a relatively 
broad product scope”). 
 29. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4; EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 97-
99 (mandating that the term “like product” in Article III:4 be interpreted in light of 
the “general principle” of Article III to avoid protectionism and “ensure ‘equality 
of competitive conditions’”). 
 30. See Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.10, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 2009) [hereinafter Panel 
Report, U.S. – Gasoline] (affirming that “less favorable treatment” is interpreted to 
mean whether a product is afforded unequal competitive opportunities than a 
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1. Domestically Produced Menthol Cigarettes and Imported Clove 
Cigarettes Are “Like Products” Under Article III:4 Because They 
Are in a Competitive Relationship 
In determining whether products are in a competitive relationship, 
the Appellate Body endorsed a four-prong analysis created by a 1970 
GATT Working Party Report on Border Taxes, which noted that the 
analysis was neither mandatory authority from a treaty nor a “closed 
list of criteria that will determine the legal characterization of 
products.”31 This framework includes an analysis of: (1) the 
products’ physical properties; (2) the extent to which the products are 
capable of serving the same end-use; (3) consumers’ perceptions and 
behavior towards the products; and (4) the products’ international 
classification for tariff purposes.32 Further, the Appellate Body 
cautioned that this list was to be used merely as a tool to examine 
relevant evidence and stressed the need to examine “all . . . pertinent 
evidence.”33 The Panel, utilizing this four-prong framework and 
examining all relevant evidence, should conclude that clove and 
menthol cigarettes are “like products.”34 
 
“like” domestically-produced product). The Panel found that the U.S. treated 
imported gasoline less favorably than domestic gasoline under Article III:4 
because government regulations forced certain importers to import gasoline at a 
lower price, which meant that importers had to “make cost and price allowances” 
because they had to import other types of gasoline to comply with the U.S. 
regulations. Id. 
 31. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 101-02; GATT General Counsel, 
Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 18, L/3464 (Nov. 20, 
1970) [hereinafter Working Party Report]; see also Robert E. Hudec, “Like 
Product”: The Difference in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY 
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 
101, 101 (Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000) (distinguishing 
between the notion that the meaning of “like product” varies depending on the 
policies behind the GATT provision at issue and the idea that “like product” 
cannot be “reduced to definable criteria”). 
 32. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 101; see, e.g., Panel Report, Brazil – 
Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 7.415, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 
2007) (showing that the Panel considers “physical characteristics, . . . end use, . . . 
tariff headings, . . . and evidence of any difference in consumers' perceptions and 
behavior” in a like product analysis). 
 33. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 102. 
 34. See id, ¶¶ 101-103 (noting that although the criteria of the Working Party 
provides a framework for analyzing “like product” questions, this does not 
“dissolve the duty or the need to examine, in each case, all of the pertinent 
evidence”). 
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First, the “properties, nature and quality” of menthol and clove 
cigarettes are very similar.35 That is, both are cigarettes comprised 
primarily of tobacco.36 Though clove cigarettes are made from a 
mixture of tobacco and approximately 30% to 40% minced cloves,37 
menthol cigarettes generally contain between 0.1% and 1.0% “of 
their tobacco weight in menthol.”38 While it is evident that the 
percentage composition of the flavoring ingredient is much greater in 
clove cigarettes than in menthol cigarettes, the Appellate Body stated 
that an analysis of physical properties must be examined in the 
context of how those properties influence the “competitive 
relationship between products in the marketplace.”39 The use of both 
clove and menthol serve as masking agents that mute the harshness 
of regular cigarettes.40 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos 
 
 35. See id. ¶ 120 (clarifying that the physical properties of the products being 
compared for likeness are important but must be analyzed in the context of all 
relevant evidence). 
 36. See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1332 
(2006) (defining cigarette as “(A) any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or in any 
substance not containing tobacco, and (B) any roll of tobacco wrapped in any 
substance containing tobacco which, because of its appearance, the type of tobacco 
in the filler, or its packaging and labeling, is likely to offered to, or purchased by, 
consumers as a cigarette described in subparagraph (A)”). Menthol and clove 
cigarettes, regardless of dimensions, fit this definition. Menthol and Clove 
cigarettes also fit the physical description of cigarettes as defined by common 
dictionaries. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 406 
(1993) (defining cigarette as “a tube of finely cut tobacco enclosed in paper, 
designed for smoking and [usually] narrower and shorter than a cigar”). See also 
C. L. Gaworski et al., Toxicologic Evaluation of Flavor Ingredients Added to 
Cigarette Tobacco: 13–week Inhalation Exposures in Rats, 10 INHALATION 
TOXICOLOGY 357, 360 (1998) (describing the typical composition of cigarettes). 
 37. See Tee L. Guidotti et al., Clove Cigarettes: The Basis for Concern 
Regarding Health Effects, 151 W. J. MED. 220, 221 (1989) (describing the 
chemical composition of clove cigarettes and remarking that clove cigarettes have 
a higher tar content then “most domestic American brands”). 
 38. See Jennifer M. Kreslake et al., Tobacco Industry Control of Menthol in 
Cigarettes and Targeting of Adolescents and Young Adults, 98 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1685, 1685 (2008) (describing the properties and effects of the menthol in 
menthol cigarettes as a “monocyclic terpene alcohol that acts as a stimulant for 
cold receptors” which gives menthol cigarettes a “cooling sensation and mintlike 
flavor” when smoked). 
 39. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 114. 
 40. See id. at 1685; Guidotti et al., supra note 37, at 221-22; cf. Bhimrao K. 
Jadhav et al., Formulation and Evaluation of Mucoadhesive Tablets Containing 
Eugenol for the Treatment of Periodontal Diseases, 30 DRUG DEV. & INDUS. 
PHARMACY 195, 196 (2004) (describing the physiological effects of Eugenol, the 
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considered toxicity to be a factor in determining products’ physical 
properties.41 However, this consideration included other factors, such 
as consumer preference for, or aversion to, such toxicity.42 Here, 
because both clove and menthol cigarettes are known to be 
carcinogens,43 the presence of toxicity should not be considered an 
influencing factor as in EC - Asbestos.44 Additionally, toxicity should 
also be excluded from the Panel’s likeness determination because 
both menthol and clove cigarettes are tobacco delivery systems 
which are federally mandated to carry health warnings regarding the 
dangers of their toxicity.45 
The United States may have a valid argument that the percentage 
composition of the constituent ingredients of these two types of 
cigarettes is sufficiently different so as to result in dissimilar levels 
of toxicity.46 This claim, however, is weakened by evidence 
suggesting that other additive-flavored cigarettes banned under the 
FDCA have a similar composition and level of toxicity as that found 
in menthol cigarettes.47 Considering that the U.S. ban extends to 
 
chemical found in clove, and its use as an anesthetic for dentistry procedures). 
 41. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 122 (finding that evidence related to 
consumer demand was relevant to determining whether health risks were posed by 
chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibers because “[i]f the risks posed by a [product] are 
sufficiently great, the [consumer] may simply cease to buy the product”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH 
PROMOTION, OFFICE ON SMOKING & HEALTH, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 3-8 (2004) [hereinafter Office on 
Smoking and Health Report] (identifying multiple forms of cancer linked to 
smoking and stating that every report the U.S. Surgeon General has issued found 
that smoking causes many diseases and harmful health effects). 
 44. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 122-24 (finding that evidence of 
consumer demand is particularly relevant to “like product” determinations when 
toxicity is present in one product but lacking in another). 
 45. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 
(2006) (mandating that cigarette manufacturers place stringent warnings on packs 
of cigarettes, regardless of flavor or inclusion of additives). 
 46. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 114 (identifying toxicity as a 
fundamental physical property of chrysotile asbestos fibers, but not of PCG fibers, 
and concluding that the varying levels of toxicity between the two types of fibers 
must be a major factor in the Panel’s likeness determination). 
 47. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907 (banning 
cigarettes containing additives, artificial flavors, and herbs and spices); Report of 
the Panel, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on 
Cigarettes, ¶ 42, 63-89, DS10/R – 37S/200 (Nov. 7, 1990) [hereinafter Thailand – 
526 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [26:2 
other flavored cigarettes with similar percentages of flavor additives 
as menthol cigarettes, this argument is unconvincing.48 Therefore, 
even after consideration of the U.S. counter-argument, the first prong 
of the test is met.  
Second, clove and menthol cigarettes perform the same end-use 
because they are both “nicotine delivery devices” for human 
beings.49 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos defined end-use as 
“capable of performing the same, or similar, functions.”50 Cigarette 
manufacturers use additives, such as clove or menthol, to enhance 
nicotine delivery by making the act of smoking more palatable for 
smokers.51 Because menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes share this 
end-use, a Panel should find this prong met.52  
 
Cigarettes] (restating the U.S. argument that all manufactured cigarettes, even 
though they may have varying tobacco mixtures, are nonetheless “like products”). 
The Panel did not rule on this specific U.S. claim. 
 48. Cf. E.L Carmines, Evaluation of the Potential Effects of Ingredients Added 
to Cigarettes. Part 1: Cigarette Design, Testing Approach, and Review of Results, 
40 FOOD & CHEMICAL TOXICOLOGY 77, 79-85 (2002) (describing the amount of 
flavoring ingredients involved in the manufacture of commercial cigarettes and 
showing that menthol, cocoa, and licorice all have similar concentrations). See 
Gaworski et al., supra note 36, at 360-62 (displaying that in a test comparing other 
flavor additives with menthol, where flavored cigarette additives were analyzed in 
the amount typically used in the manufacturing process, cocoa powder had a 
higher concentration and vanilla extract had a much lower concentration per 
cigarette). 
 49. Cf. Kreslake et al., supra note 38, at 1689 (stating that additive ingredients 
in cigarettes affect the “uptake” of the active drugs in cigarettes). 
 50. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117 (establishing that end-use of a 
product is linked explicitly to whether the products are in a competitive 
relationship). 
 51. See J. S. WIGAND, ADDITIVES, CIGARETTE DESIGN AND TOBACCO PRODUCT 
REGULATION TBD (2006), available at http://www.jeffreywigand.com/ 
WHOFinal.pdf (listing the physiological effects of additives in cigarettes, 
including the amelioration of the effects of smoking by “making it more palatable 
either through the use of sweeteners or chemical agents that negate the normal 
airway aversion to smoke or have pharmacological action”). 
 52. Compare Kreslake, supra note 38, at 1689 (showing that scientific 
evidence supports the proposition that menthol cigarettes and clove cigarettes share 
the same end-use because they both have ingredients that affect the user’s uptake 
of the smoke produced by the product), with EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 144 
(positing that the Appellate Body could not conclusively determine whether 
products containing asbestos fibers could fulfill all the same end-uses as products 
without asbestos fibers and therefore could not determine whether the two products 
generally fulfilled the same end-use). 
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Third, consumers use clove and menthol cigarettes for the same 
purpose: to fulfill a desire to smoke a tobacco product.53 The 
Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos stated that evidence regarding the 
extent to which consumers chose one product over another is “highly 
relevant evidence in assessing the ‘likeness’ of those products under 
Article III:4.”54 Consumers’ tastes and habits clearly show that they 
buy cigarettes, regardless of flavor, to fulfill a pharmacological, 
social, or personal need.55 The fact that menthol cigarettes have a 
much larger market share is not directly relevant under the EC – 
Asbestos interpretation, which instead focuses on consumers’ ability 
to choose between the products.56 Before the ban, consumers were 
able to exercise a choice; now they cannot.57 
Finally, the tariff classifications of menthol and clove cigarettes 
are very comparable.58 Though the EC - Asbestos Appellate Body 
Report downplayed the importance of the tariff classification factor 
in determining whether products are like, it is still a relevant element 
in the “like product” analysis.59 According to the U.S. International 
Trade Commission’s Harmonized Tariff Schedule, all cigarette 
 
 53. See Martin J. Jarvis, ABC of Smoking Cessation: Why People Smoke, 328 
BRIT. MED. J. 277, 277 (2004) (recognizing that “smoking is primarily a 
manifestation of nicotine addiction” but also that people smoke cigarettes for a 
number of reasons besides their pharmacological effects, including personal, 
social, economic, and political reasons). 
 54. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117. 
 55. See Jarvis, supra note 53, at 277 (averring that “[s]ocial, economic, 
personal, and political influences [help] determin[e] patterns of smoking”); 
Kreslake, supra note 38, at 1685 (stating that the cigarette industry constantly 
“develops product innovations to encourage experimentation and use” among 
smokers). 
 56. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 117 (finding that if there is no 
competitive relationship between two products, then there is no way to 
comparatively measure consumers’ taste and habits with regard to those products). 
 57. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907 (banning 
the sale of all flavored cigarettes except for menthol cigarettes). 
 58. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States, ch. 24-12 (2010), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 
docs/tata/hts/bychapter/1000htsa.pdf [hereinafter Harmonized Tariff Schedule] 
(showing that all cigarettes, including clove and menthol cigarettes, share the same 
tariff heading). 
 59. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 140 (finding that the divergent tariff 
headings for chrysotile asbestos fibers and PCG fibers tended to indicate that the 
products were not “like products” under Article III:4). 
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tariffs are located under the heading 2402.20.60 For international 
tariff purposes, clove cigarettes and menthol cigarettes are treated 
identically, and thus the fourth prong is unequivocally met.61 
Application of the four-pronged EC – Asbestos analysis therefore 
reveals that menthol and clove cigarettes are “like products” because 
they share the same end-use, have an identical tariff classification, 
are physically similar, and are employed by consumers to fill an 
analogous need.62 
2. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes is Discriminatory Under Article III:4 
Because the Competitive Opportunities for Clove Cigarettes are Less 
than Those for Menthol Cigarettes. 
After finding that clove and menthol cigarettes are “like products,” 
the Panel should conclude that the United States gives imported 
clove cigarettes less favorable treatment than domestically produced 
menthol cigarettes.63 In U.S. – Gasoline the Panel determined that 
less favorable treatment exists where an imported product has fewer 
equal competitive opportunities than a domestically produced 
product.64 
 
 60. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 58, at 24-12 (showing that 
cigarettes containing tobacco generally have the tariff heading 2402.20, and that 
clove cigarettes are a subset of cigarettes containing tobacco and have the sub-
heading 2402.20.10); see generally Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Tariff 
Schedules: Harmonized System and World Customs Organization, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/tariff-
schedules (explaining that the U.S.’ harmonized tariff schedule is based on the 
classification scheme created by the International Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (“HS”) administered by the World Customs 
Organization, which sets the global standard tariff classification system). This 
tariff system is used by over 200 countries and economies around the world and 
more than ninety-eight percent of goods traded internationally are categorized by 
the HS. Id. 
 61. Harmonized Tariff Schedule, supra note 58. 
 62. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 101 (outlining the four-pronged test). 
 63. See GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (providing that imported products 
“shall be accorded treatment no less favourable” than like domestic products). 
 64. See Panel Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.10 (finding, inter 
alia, that U.S. standards for gasoline cleanliness were more burdensome for 
imported gasoline than domestically produced gasoline, making imported gasoline 
more expensive); see also Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting 
Import of Fresh, Chilled, and Frozen Beef, ¶ 139, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Beef] (finding that Korea 
violated Article III:4 by requiring that imported beef be sold separately from 
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In the present case, the Panel will have little trouble determining 
that the Act treats menthol cigarettes more favorably than it does 
clove cigarettes. The Indonesian complaint is analogous to U.S. – 
Gasoline because the competitive conditions surrounding menthol 
cigarettes are much more favorable than the conditions afforded to 
clove cigarettes; FDCA allows the former to be sold in the United 
States but bans the latter.65 Therefore, because menthol and clove 
cigarettes are “like products,” and because the United States affords 
clove cigarettes less favorable treatment than menthol cigarettes, the 
Panel should find that the U.S. ban is a discriminatory trade practice 
under current interpretation of Article III:4. 
B. THE PUBLIC HEALTH EXCEPTION OF ARTICLE XX(B) DOES NOT 
APPLY BECAUSE THE BAN ON CLOVE CIGARETTES IS NOT 
NECESSARY AND IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BINDING GOAL OF 
THE ARTICLE’S CHAPEAU. 
The ban cannot be justified as an exception under Article XX(b).66 
An Article XX(b) exception will be valid only if a member country 
establishes three elements: (1) the policy in question protects human, 
animal, or plant life or health; (2) the policy is necessary to reach the 
policy objective; and (3) the measures meet the requirements of the 
introduction, or chapeau, of Article XX.67 While the United States 
 
domestic beef). In Korea – Beef, the government mandated “dual-retail system” for 
sales of beef was less favorable to imported beef products because 1) consumers 
were hindered from comparing the products; 2) retailers had to substitute imported 
beef for all domestic beef; 3) market-opportunities for imported beef were 
curtailed; and 4) consumers were led to believe that imported and domestic beef 
were different even though they were “like products” under Article III:4. Id. 
 65. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907; Panel 
Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.10 (noting that an Article III:4 
violation occurs when competitive conditions are different between domestic and 
imported products). 
 66. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX(b) (exempting measures “necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health”); cf. EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶¶ 
162-163, 192 (finding that asbestos was a health risk and holding that its adverse 
treatment was appropriate under the Article XX(b) exception). 
 67. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX (“Subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures [falling within one of the expressly provided exceptions].”); see also 
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can prove that its policy is designed to protect human health, it 
cannot prove that the ban is necessary or that it conforms to the 
binding goal of the chapeau of Article XX.68 
1. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Is a Policy Designed to Protect 
Human Life and the Health of American Children. 
The United States will likely argue that the ban is defensible under 
an XX(b) exemption because the ban on flavored cigarettes protects 
U.S. children from the harms of smoking cigarettes.69 To determine 
whether a policy’s purpose is to protect human health, the Panel 
generally considers the design and structure of the policy.70 The 
United States can offer data on the dangers of child smoking71 to 
 
Panel Report, U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 30, ¶ 6.20 (noting that the party that 
invokes the exception has the burden of proof for demonstrating that the 
inconsistent measure is within the scope of Article XX exceptions). Though the 
U.S. – Gasoline dispute was not reviewed by the Appellate Body, the Panel also 
used this test in EC – Asbestos and European Communities – Conditions for the 
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries. See Panel Report, 
European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing 
Products, ¶ 8.184, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos Panel 
Report] (using the U.S. – Gasoline test to determine if the ban on asbestos-
containing products fit within an Article XX(b) exception); Panel Report, 
European Communities – Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to 
Developing Countries, ¶¶ 7.198–7.199, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter 
EC – Tariff Preferences] (employing the U.S. – Gasoline test to determine whether 
arrangements to combat drug production and trafficking in developing countries 
were justified under Article XX(b)). 
 68. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX. 
 69. See, e.g., World Health Org. (“WHO”), The Scientific Basis of Tobacco 
Product Regulation, at 36-37, No. 945 (2007), http://www.who.int/tobacco/global 
_interaction/tobreg/9789241209458.pdf (indicating that flavored cigarettes tend to 
target youths by “promoting youth initiation and helping young occasional 
smokers to become daily smokers by reducing or masking the natural harshness 
and taste of tobacco smoke”); see also discussion infra Part III(B)(2) (noting that 
the upcoming 2011 scientific study, required by the Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act, will investigate the effects of menthol cigarettes and 
report its findings by March 2011). 
 70. See EC — Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, ¶¶ 7.201-202, 7.207 (finding 
that the policy behind the EC’s Drug Arrangements, which granted certain tariff 
preferences, was designed to fulfill sustainable development and poverty 
objectives and not to protect human health). 
 71. See OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH REPORT, supra note 43, at 3 
(outlining the “diseases and other adverse health effects” linked to smoking); 29 
Surgeon General’s Reports on Smoking and Health, 1964–2006, U.S. OFFICE OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL (2006), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/second 
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prove that the ban on clove cigarettes protects children from the 
dangers of smoking.  
The present case is factually analogous to Thailand – Cigarettes, 
where the Panel, using an older Article XX(b) analysis that stressed 
whether other alternative measures were reasonably available, found 
that smoking was a risk to human health and that policies designed to 
reduce the number of smokers fell within the scope of Article 
XX(b).72 The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos found that asbestos-
containing products were scientifically shown to cause human 
harm.73 Here, the U.S. Congress passed a law with a designed intent 
similar to the questioned policy in Thailand - Cigarettes: reducing 
the number of children who smoke cigarettes.74 By banning the sale 
of flavored cigarettes, Congress sought to remove an opportunity for 
children to become regular, daily smokers and to reduce the risk of 
tobacco-related disease.75 The Panel will have no difficulty finding 
that Indonesian-produced clove cigarettes pose a health risk to U.S. 
children, and therefore, the United States will fulfill the first element 
required for an Article XX(b) exception.76  
 
handsmoke/factsheets/factsheet8.html (summarizing the findings of the twenty-
nine U.S. Surgeon General reports that found adverse health consequences related 
to smoking cigarettes). 
 72. See Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶¶ 73-74 (explaining that the 
meaning of “necessary” under Article XX(b) is the same as that under Article 
XX(d)); see also Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 2(14), 
(30)-(31) (elucidating Congressional findings that reducing the number of children 
who smoke is a goal of the legislation). 
 73. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 157 (finding that asbestos-containing 
products cause certain human illnesses). 
 74. Compare Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶ 38 (noting that the goal of 
the Thai policy was to reduce the harm to the public caused by cigarettes), with 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 2(1)-(7), (13)-(14) 
(stating that tobacco regulation is in the U.S.’ public interest and expressing 
concern with the adverse health consequences associated with smoking, 
particularly those that affect youth smokers). 
 75. See Enforcement of General Tobacco Standard Special Rule for Cigarettes, 
74 Fed. Reg. 48974 (FDA Sept. 25, 2009) (notice) [hereinafter FDA Notice] 
(explaining that from Congress’ perspective, “[t]he removal from the market of 
cigarettes that contain certain characterizing flavors is an important step in the 
FDA’s efforts to reduce the burden of illness and death caused by tobacco 
products” because flavored cigarettes appeal to children and make it more likely 
that youth smokers will become addicted to smoking). 
 76. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 175 (clarifying that if a Panel 
recognizes a credible health risk, then the member has established a prima facie 
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2. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Is Unnecessary Because the United 
States Can Pursue Other Nondiscriminatory Policy Measures That 
Accomplish Its Public Health Objectives. 
Though the ban on clove cigarettes prevents children from 
smoking clove cigarettes, the policy by which the goal is achieved 
fails the Article XX(b) “necessary” requirement.77 For a measure to 
be necessary, the Appellate Body requires that the measure be close 
to “indispensible” to protect human health.78 The Appellate Body in 
Brazil – Tyres reaffirmed an established balancing test in evaluating 
whether a policy is “necessary”: the trade restricting elements of the 
questioned policy are weighed against the degree to which it protects 
human, plant, or animal health.79 Furthermore, a member’s policy is 
necessary only if no other alternative would satisfy the policy’s goals 
while remaining consistent with its obligations under GATT.80  
The United States faces a difficult task in proving the nonexistence 
of other, less intrusive means to achieve the policy’s goal that do not 
discriminate against foreign products and are consistent with 
GATT.81 The Appellate Body addressed a similar problem in EC – 
 
case for an Article XX(b) exception). 
 77. See EC - Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, ¶¶ 7.197(2), 7.211–7.213 
(stating that to invoke an Article XX(b) exception, a party must show that the 
“inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were 
necessary” to fulfill the policy objective)(emphasis omitted). 
 78. See id. ¶ 7.211 (describing a continuum of policies that could be considered 
necessary, and opining that the policy should be closer to “‘indispensible’” in 
protecting human health, rather than merely “making a ‘contribution to’” 
protecting human health). 
 79. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of 
Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 24, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil – 
Tyres] (“Weighing and balancing involves, first, an individual assessment of each 
element (importance of the objective pursued; trade restrictiveness of the measure; 
contribution of the measure to the achievement of the objective) and, then, a 
consideration of the role and relative importance of each element together with the 
other elements, for the purposes of deciding whether the challenged measure is 
necessary to achieve the relevant objective.”). 
 80. See Thailand – Cigarettes, supra note 47, ¶¶ 74-75 (finding that Thailand’s 
restrictions on cigarette imports would be considered “necessary . . . only if there 
were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or less 
inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ to 
achieve its health policy objectives”). 
 81. See EC – Tariff Preferences, supra note 67, at ¶¶ 7.176, 7.236, 8.1 
(determining that the EC’s Drug Arrangements, which suspended the Generalized 
System of Preferences (“GSP”), were inconsistent with GATT because they did 
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Asbestos, where they inquired whether there was an alternative 
policy that would restrict trade less severely than an outright ban on 
asbestos-containing products.82 However, unlike the Appellate Body 
determination in EC – Asbestos, which found that the ban on 
asbestos-containing fibers was necessary because there were no other 
feasible alternative policies, the United States has other ways to 
fulfill its health policy objectives.83 For example, the United States 
could pass legislation that would place all flavored cigarettes in the 
same regulatory framework.84 Additionally, the United States could 
rescind the ban on flavored cigarettes and replace it with a tax that 
would apply to all flavored cigarettes, including menthol cigarettes.85 
Besides taxation-based solutions, the United States could enact 
legislation that would include menthol cigarettes in the ban on all 
flavored cigarettes.86 Any of these alternative solutions would fulfill 
the health policy goals of the Act without violating GATT’s 
nondiscrimination obligations.87  
The United States claims that a scientific report mandated by the 
Act will aid in determining how menthol cigarettes will be regulated 
in the future.88 Specifically, section 907(e) of the Act mandates the 
creation of a report that will study the “impact of the use of menthol 
 
not apply equally to all countries). 
 82. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 174 (concluding that there was no 
viable alternative to a blanket ban on products containing asbestos that could 
achieve the desired health objective of reducing exposure to carcinogens). 
 83. See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV (discussing potential legislative 
solutions). 
 84. See discussion infra Part IV (describing four potential GATT-consistent 
legislative solutions that would, to varying degrees, fulfill the Act’s policy goals). 
 85. See id. (discussing taxation and other possible regulatory solutions that are 
GATT-consistent and that would fulfill the policy goals of the Act). 
 86. Such a solution could entail deleting the legislative exception for menthol 
cigarettes in Section 907(a)(1)(A) of the FDCA. See Family Smoking Prevention 
and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 907(a)(1)(A) (amending the FDCA to include 
provisions of the Act and exempting menthol cigarettes from the flavored cigarette 
ban). 
 87. See id. § 2 (observing that youth smoking is a serious public health 
problem); see also GATT, supra note 12, art. XX (requiring that any policy used to 
protect human health not discriminate against foreign goods). 
 88. See Jonathan Lynn, US Rejects Panel on Clove Cigarette Ban, REUTERS, 
June 22, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLDE65 
L1O920100622 (citing a U.S. official who argued that a request for a Panel ruling 
was premature because the legislation calls for a scientific Panel to investigate and 
issue a report on the effects of menthol cigarettes by March 2011). 
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in cigarettes on the public health, including such use among children, 
African-Americans, Latinos, and other racial and ethnic minorities,” 
before taking further action.89 If the United States plans to defend the 
section 907(e) policy on the grounds that it is necessary to protect 
human health and that it is based on sound scientific evidence, it will 
fall short for two reasons. First, the argument likely fails because it 
does not convincingly explain why the policy must violate GATT 
Article III:4 by discriminating against all non-menthol flavored 
cigarettes.90 Second, the reliance on the particular scientific study 
mandated by section 907(e) is unlikely to convince the Panel that the 
ban is necessary. The Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos addressed the 
role of scientific evidence in determining policies “necessary” to 
protect health.91 The Appellate Body stated: “A [m]ember is not 
obliged, in setting health policy, automatically to follow what, at a 
given time, may constitute a majority scientific opinion.”92 EC – 
Asbestos best explained the treatment of scientific evidence by 
stating that “‘responsible and representative governments may act in 
good faith on the basis of what, at a given time, may be a divergent 
opinion coming from qualified and respected sources.’”93 The United 
States seems to argue that, by mandating a scientific study on the 
health effects of menthol cigarettes, it is performing needed scientific 
assessments before considering further legislation that would place 
restrictions on menthol cigarettes.94 This argument provides weak 
justification for treating menthol differently. Current scientific 
 
 89. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 908(e). 
 90. See id.; GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4 (declaring that foreign products 
must be given treatment “no less favourable” than that given to similar domestic 
products). 
 91. See EC – Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 167 (discussing the scientific evidence 
regarding whether exposure to asbestos-containing cement products was harmful 
to human health). 
 92. See id. ¶¶ 29, 178 (concluding that a Panel does not need to reach a 
decision based on the preponderance of the evidence standard when reaching a 
decision on an Article XX(b) issue). 
 93. See id. ¶¶ 177-81 (quoting Appellate Body Report, European Communities 
– Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶ 194, 
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, (Feb. 13, 1998)) (holding that where France 
relied in good faith on scientific evidence showing that certain asbestos-containing 
products were harmful to human health, that scientific evidence was a legitimate 
basis for its policy decision). 
 94. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e) 
(calling for the scientific study on menthol cigarettes). 
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literature, including extensive research released by the U.S. Surgeon 
General, overwhelmingly and uniformly supports the conclusion that 
all cigarettes, including menthol cigarettes, are harmful to human 
health.95 It is therefore highly dubious that the United States can offer 
this argument in good faith as required by the clear interpretation 
given by the Appellate Body in EC – Asbestos. 
3. The Ban on Clove Cigarettes Violates the Chapeau of Article XX 
Because It Discriminates Against Indonesian Imports of Clove 
Cigarettes. 
If Indonesia proves that, under subparagraph (b), the U.S. ban is 
not necessary to protect human health, the analysis ends and the U.S. 
would be found in violation of its WTO obligations.96 However, even 
if the United States succeeds in convincing the Panel that the ban is 
necessary, the ban would still fail under the requirements of the 
chapeau.97 The chapeau prohibits measures that constitute arbitrary 
and unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail and are a hidden restriction on international 
trade.98 GATT’s negotiators constructed the chapeau with the goal of 
preventing abuse of the Article XX exceptions.99 According to the 
Appellate Body in U.S. – Shrimp, three constituent elements must be 
 
 95. See 29 Surgeon General’s Reports, supra note 71 (listing and surveying 
Surgeon Generals’ Reports from 1964 through 2006 addressing the impact of 
smoking on health, all of which conclude that all cigarettes have deleterious health 
effects); see also About the Office of the Surgeon General, OFFICE OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL, http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/about/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2010) (stating the mission of the Surgeon General is to “provid[e] 
Americans [with] the best scientific information available on how to improve their 
health and reduce the risk of illness and injury”). 
 96. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 22-23 (explaining that an Article XX 
analysis is a “two-tiered” test because it is subject to the particular exceptions 
listed in Article XX(a)-(j) and to the introductory requirements of Article XX’s 
chapeau). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 22-24 (clarifying that the chapeau is to be applied reasonably 
with regard to the particular exceptions of Article XX, and construed broadly to 
avoid arbitrary or discriminatory trade violations, unless one of the listed 
exceptions applies). 
 99. See U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 15, ¶ 157 (noting that pursuant to the 
negotiation history of the chapeau, the Article XX exceptions should be applied in 
a “limited and conditional” manner). 
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present before a policy violates the chapeau:100 (1) the applied 
measure must be discriminatory;101 (2) the discrimination must be 
arbitrary or unjustifiable;102 and (3) the discrimination must be found 
between countries where “the same conditions prevail.”103  
The U.S. ban meets all three elements of this test and thus violates 
the Article XX chapeau. When considering the first two elements of 
the test, the Panel should find that the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes is 
discriminatory because it is “arbitrary or unjustifiable.”104 In EC – 
Asbestos, the Panel Report observed that in order to find a policy 
arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminatory, the Panel must examine the 
manner in which a member applies the questioned policy.105 Here, 
the Panel found that a French ban on all white asbestos, including 
those produced domestically, did not violate the chapeau because it 
did not unfairly or unjustifiably discriminate against imported 
asbestos.106 In U.S. – Gasoline, the Appellate Body found that a U.S. 
policy of regulating imported gasoline differently than domestic 
gasoline was unjustifiable under the chapeau partly because the 
United States did not consider the cost of its policies on other 
 
 100. See id. ¶ 150 (stating that these elements underlie the concept of “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevail” as stated in the chapeau). 
 101. See id. ¶ 176 (deciding that the application of U.S. law to various countries 
that export shrimp was discriminatory, and finding that discrimination is an 
element in determining whether a country’s policy violates the chapeau). 
 102. See id. ¶ 184 (finding that a U.S. certification process for applicant 
countries seeking to meet U.S. standards for shrimp imports was discriminatory in 
that it was both “arbitrary” and “unjustifiable,” causing the Appellate Body to hold 
that the certification policy violated the chapeau). 
 103. See GATT, supra note 12, art. XX; U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 15, ¶ 184 
(finding that arbitrary discrimination occurred in countries with like conditions 
where shrimp caught using methods acceptable to U.S. regulations were banned 
from the U.S. because they were caught in the waters of countries that were not 
certified by the U.S.); U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 23-24 (finding that the 
standard of “where the same conditions prevail” applies to both conditions in 
importing and exporting countries, as well as conditions found only in exporting 
countries). 
 104. GATT, supra note 12, art. XX. 
 105. See EC – Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 67, ¶ 8.226. 
 106. Id. ¶¶ 2.3-2.5, 8.222-8.224 (noting that the French ban was applied equally 
to like exports and domestic products, and that the ban was intended to protect 
workers and consumers from the hazardous health effects associated with 
asbestos). 
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countries.107  
The present case can be distinguished from EC – Asbestos because 
the ban on flavored cigarettes singles out nations that are large 
exporters of clove cigarettes and leaves U.S. menthol producers with 
a monopoly on legally-available flavored cigarettes.108 In this respect, 
the U.S. ban is similar to actions that prompted the Venezuelan 
complaint in U.S. – Gasoline.109 In the present case, there is little 
evidence that the U.S. Congress substantively considered the trade 
implications of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control 
Act.110 The Indonesian economy feels the impact of the U.S. ban on 
clove cigarettes much more acutely than the U.S. economy because 
“the [U.S.] does not produce clove cigarettes, whereas ninety-nine 
percent of the clove cigarettes imported by the [U.S.] come from 
Indonesia.”111  
 
 107. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 28-29 (finding that the U.S. 
discrimination against imported gasoline was unjustifiable because it “must have 
been foreseen” and was likely avoidable). The Panel held that the nature of 
discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX was different than that needed 
under Article III:4, and noted that the U.S. policy went “beyond what was 
necessary for the Panel to determine that a violation of Article III:4 had occurred in 
the first place.” See id. 
 108. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(a) 
(banning all flavored cigarettes except for menthol flavored cigarettes); EC – 
Asbestos, supra note 12, ¶ 2 (noting that France’s ban on asbestos products was a 
blanket ban, prohibiting use of asbestos from manufacture to sales in the French 
domestic marketplace). 
 109. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, at 28-29 (finding that the U.S. failed to 
account for the cost to refiners in importing countries by not cooperating with 
foreign governments to help mitigate the impact of imposing statutory baselines 
under the U.S. Gasoline Rule). 
 110. See 155 CONG. REC. E912-13 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (accounting for 
what was the only statement in the Congressional Record during debate on the bill 
that raised the potential implications of the Act on the U.S.-Indonesia trade 
relationship). 
 111. See 155 CONG. REC. E913-14 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 2009) (Letter from Mari 
Elka Pagestu, Minister of Trade, Republic of Indonesia, to Ambassador Susan 
Schwab, United States Trade Representative) (contrasting the fact that the U.S. 
does not produce clove cigarettes with the fact that menthol cigarettes are produced 
“almost exclusively” in the U.S. and highlighting the fact that clove cigarettes 
accounted for only 0.1% of the total U.S. cigarette market); see also Mark Drajem 
& Lorraine Woellert, Clove Cigarettes May Prompt U.S., Indonesia Dispute 
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=21070001&sid= a9YjoELUY1jU (stating that about one-fifth of 
Indonesia’s $500 million per year export value of clove cigarettes were imported to 
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The third element is satisfied because the ban applies to all 
cigarettes, except menthol, regardless of where they were 
manufactured.112 U.S. – Gasoline clarifies that the discrimination 
may refer to differences in the conditions imposed on an exporting 
country versus an importing country, as well as to differences in 
conditions between various exporting countries.113 In the present 
case, U.S. firms may manufacture and sell menthol cigarettes in the 
United States, but Indonesia cannot export clove cigarettes to the 
United States.114 Therefore, due to the structure and impact of the 
U.S. ban on flavored cigarettes, it violates the chapeau because it is 
unjustifiably discriminatory between countries where the same 
conditions prevail. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Presuming the Panel will find the United States in violation of its 
trade obligations under GATT, Congress will likely be compelled to 
pass legislation that ends the discrimination against Indonesian-
produced clove cigarettes. Congress can enact four policies that 
would bring the United States into compliance with GATT while still 
retaining the policy goals of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act. 
First, Congress can legislate the ban to apply equally across all 
flavored-cigarette categories. A blanket ban on all flavored cigarettes 
would ensure that all flavored cigarettes, regardless of where they 
were manufactured, would be consistent with the nondiscrimination 
principles of Article III:4.115 This solution is the simplest and most 
effective way to create a public policy that keeps children from 
smoking flavored cigarettes.116 If the legislative history of the Family 
 
the United States). 
 112. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 907. 
 113. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 19, 23-24 (stating that the assumption that 
the chapeau applies to both importing and exporting countries was a “common 
understanding” between the parties). 
 114. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, §§ 101, 901, 
907(a)(1)(A) (expanding the authority of the FDA to regulate tobacco-based 
products, but excepting menthol under a special provisionary rule). 
 115. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:4. 
 116. See Press Release, David T. Tayloe, Jr., President, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 
Press Statement on FDA Ban on Flavored Cigarettes a Strong First Step Under 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (Sept. 23, 2009) (arguing 
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Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act is an indication, any 
further legislation seeking to ban all flavored cigarettes, including 
menthol, will likely face political challenges that will limit any 
prospects for enactment.117 The U.S. domestic cigarette industry and 
other interested groups lobbied vigorously for the menthol 
exception.118 Thus, it is doubtful whether the political capital 
necessary to legislate such a ban in the near future exists.  
Second, Congress can create other regulatory tools that can 
potentially realize the policy goal of reducing youth smoking. Such 
regulations could include any combination of the following policies, 
as long as the United States implements them consistently across all 
types of flavored cigarettes: taxation, packaging guidelines, or 
educational programs. The United States often employs punitive 
taxation as a disincentive for smokers, but its effectiveness on 
consumer behavior is questionable.119 Alternatively, warning labels 
specific to flavored cigarettes may have an effect on consumer 
behavior.120 Finally, there is evidence that comprehensive programs 
 
that ”the strongest possible tobacco regulation is necessary to protect [America’s] 
children and adolescents”). 
 117. See Associated Press, Committee OKs Tobacco Rules Critics Question 
Cooperation from Philip Morris, AUGUSTA CHRON., Aug. 2, 2007, at A10 (noting 
that the Act was the product of several years of negotiations between Senators, 
“health groups,” and “tobacco giant Philip Morris,” and recognizing that the 
legislation passed despite concerns from representatives of tobacco producing 
states that the Act would increase Philip Morris’ already dominant market share). 
 118. See Alicia Mundy & Lauren Etter, Senate Passes FDA Tobacco Bill, WALL 
ST. J., June 12, 2009, at B5 (reporting that, since 1998, the cigarette industry has 
paid out $308 million lobbying against the Act and that the Congressional Black 
Caucus pushed for the menthol exception because “[a]bout 75% of African-
American smokers buy menthol brands”). 
 119. See, e.g., The Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 
2009, Pub. L. No. 111–3, § 701, 123 Stat. 8, 99–101 (codified at I.R.C. § 5701(a)–
(g) (Supp. III 2009)) (increasing federal cigarette taxes); Bruce Kennedy, Tobacco 
Taxes Grow Globally, But Do They Really Work?, DAILY FINANCE (July 8, 2010, 
11:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/taxes/global-tobacco-
taxes/19545924/ (citing the comments of Randal Kuhn, Director of the Global 
Health Affairs Program at the University of Denver, regarding the influence that 
higher cigarette taxes have on smoker behavior and reporting that smokers tend to 
buy cheaper brands when prices rise rather than stop smoking altogether). 
Additionally, any taxation of cigarettes must comply with the requirements of 
GATT Article III:2 on the application of internal taxation measures on foreign 
products. GATT, supra note 12, art. III:2. 
 120. See David Hammond et al., Text and Graphic Warnings on Cigarette 
Packages: Findings from the International Tobacco Control Four Country Study, 
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aimed at curtailing youth smoking can be effective.121 Such steps, if 
implemented evenly across all types of flavored cigarettes, are 
compliant with Article III:4. 
Third, the United States can treat all flavored cigarettes equally by 
placing a temporary moratorium on the sale of all flavored cigarettes 
pending the result of a congressionally mandated scientific study. 
This policy would be similar to the study on menthol cigarettes 
mandated by section 907(e) of the Act.122 If the study includes other 
flavored cigarettes, and if it is consistent with other scientific, peer-
reviewed literature on the unique dangers of flavored cigarettes, then 
it may provide Congress with enough political cover to pass a 
blanket ban on all flavored cigarettes. The most glaring shortcoming 
of this recommendation is that it temporarily leaves flavored 
cigarettes on the market contrary to the intent of the original Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. 
Finally, Congress can institute a temporary ban on menthol 
cigarettes that would “sunset” after the conclusion of the scientific 
report.123 After a temporary ban sunsets, Congress can choose to 
extend or eliminate it entirely.124 However, the cigarette industry 
groups that advocated for the menthol exception in the Act would 
likely oppose such a measure.125 A sunset provision may serve as a 
 
32 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 202, 202 (2007) (comparing the “size, position, and 
design” of warning labels on cigarette packages in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and finding that large, visible warnings  have a 
high correlation with increased effectiveness). 
 121. See, e.g., Melanie Wakefield & Frank Chaloupka, Effectiveness of 
Comprehensive Tobacco Control Programmes in Reducing Teenage Smoking in 
the USA, 9 TOBACCO CONTROL 177, 184 (2000) (concluding that there is evidence 
that comprehensive tobacco control programs can alter the factors that influence 
teenage smoking, ultimately reducing the number of teens who smoke). 
 122. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 907(e); see 
discussion supra Part II(A) (discussing the § 907(e) requirement that the FDA 
Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee study “the impact of the use of 
menthol in cigarettes on the public health” with particular focus on minorities). 
 123. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a sunset law 
as “a statute under which a governmental agency or program automatically 
terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally renewed”). 
 124. See generally VIRGINIA A MCMURTY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22181, 
A SUNSET COMMISSION FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
CRS-1 (July 21, 2006) (stating that the sunset legislative concept allows for 
programs to expire automatically unless expressly renewed). 
 125. See C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH 
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vehicle to bring the United States into compliance with its WTO 
obligations, while also providing legislative cover to politicians 
adverse to an outright departure from the Act.126 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. ban on flavored cigarettes violates its WTO obligations. 
Under an Article III:4 analysis, clove and menthol cigarettes are 
“like products” because they are in a competitive relationship, share 
the same end-use and are used by consumers to fulfill that end-use, 
have almost identical tariff classifications, and are physically 
similar.127 The United States discriminates against Indonesian-
produced clove cigarettes because it allows for the sale and 
manufacture of domestically produced menthol cigarettes while 
banning the sale of clove cigarettes. Furthermore, the United States 
cannot rely on an Article XX(b) exception because, while the 
flavored cigarette ban was designed to protect human health, the 
policy is unnecessarily discriminatory and violates the chapeau of 
Article XX.128 Though there are numerous ways that the United 
States can change its current policy, the political feasibility of these 
options remains uncertain. 
 
 
SERV., R40475, FDA TOBACCO REGULATION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION 
AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT 3-4 (May 28, 2009) (noting that the decision to 
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 126. See Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 4, 
2004, at 67, available at http://www.legalaffairs. org/issues/January-February-
2004/story_mooney_janfeb04.msp (maintaining that sunset provisions can buy 
politicians time to deal with controversial issues in the short term, but will create 
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determine whether products are considered “like products” under Article III:4). 
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